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Abstract
Traditional navigation services find the fastest route for a single driver. Though always using
the fastest route seems desirable for every individual, selfish behavior can have undesirable
effects such as higher energy consumption and avoidable congestion, even leading to higher
overall and individual travel times. In contrast, strategic routing aims at optimizing the
traffic for all agents regarding a global optimization goal. We introduce a framework to
formalize real-world strategic routing scenarios as algorithmic problems and study one of
them, which we call Single Alternative Path (SAP), in detail. There, we are given an original
route between a single origin–destination pair. The goal is to suggest an alternative route
to all agents that optimizes the overall travel time under the assumption that the agents
distribute among both routes according to a psychological model, for which we introduce the
concept of Pareto-conformity. We show that the SAP problem is NP-complete, even for such
models. Nonetheless, assuming Pareto-conformity, we give multiple algorithms for different
variants of SAP, using multi-criteria shortest path algorithms as subroutines. Moreover, we
prove that several natural models are in fact Pareto-conform. The implementation of our
algorithms serves as a proof of concept, showing that SAP can be solved in reasonable time
even though the algorithms have exponential running time in the worst case.
1 Introduction
Commuting is part of our daily lives. Street congestion, traffic jams and pollution became an
increasingly large issue in the last few decades. In German cities, these effects caused costs of
about 3 billion euros in 2019 [11]. Many traffic jams in cities could have been avoided by better
route choice. Partly this is because of non-optimal route choices by individuals due to bounded
rationality and route preferences other than “fastest” [30]. However, even with individually
optimal route choice, average travel time can be substantially worse compared to a system
optimum where all routes are centrally assigned [22]. Thus, there is an opportunity for improving
traffic via strategic routing where (re)routing recommendations are created by traffic authorities
and taken into account by the driver’s routing system. More precisely, we speak of strategic
routing when two conditions are met:
(i) One or more routes are calculated to be proposed to more than one agent, and
(ii) the quality of a set of proposed routes is being defined by a shared scoring rather than
scoring each agent individually.
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Recent research indicates that many drivers would accept individually slower routes if this
contributes to an overall reduction in traffic [27, 14]; additionally, incentives such as free parking
could be granted to those accepting these routes, and future autonomous vehicles may be more
amenable to centralized control. Thus, (re)routing recommendations can have a strong impact
since they might be followed by a significant fraction of all drivers.
In the ongoing pilot research project Socrates 2.0, strategic routing is employed in the area of
Amsterdam [25]. For this, experts predefine alternative routes and traffic conditions that trigger
their recommendation. This requires extensive work and monitoring, and does not capture well
unusual traffic situations where there might be several incidents at once causing delays. Thus,
it is desirable to automate this by formalizing strategic routing and finding algorithms that
calculate strategic routes.
Our Contribution. Strategic routing as defined above is not a single algorithmic problem
but rather a concept capturing numerous scenarios leading to different problems. In Section 2,
we provide a framework to guide the process of formalizing real-world strategic routing scenarios.
We apply it to one specific scenario, namely Single Alternative Path (SAP). This scenario is
inspired by the Amsterdam use case mentioned above where congestion can be prevented by
suggesting one alternative route to all agents, e.g., via a variable-message sign. We consider
different psychological models to determine how many agents follow the suggestion. Moreover,
we consider variants of the SAP problem that require the alternative to be more or less disjoint
from the original route. See Section 2.2 for a formal definition.
To tackle SAP algorithmically, we introduce the concept of Pareto-conformity of psychological
models and, based on this, give various algorithms in Section 3. As they use multi-criteria
shortest path algorithms as subroutine, they have an exponential worst-case running time but
turn out to be sufficiently efficient in practice; see our evaluation in Section 6. Moreover,
in this generality, we cannot hope for better worst-case bounds as SAP is NP-hard, even for
Pareto-conform psychological models; see Section 5. In Section 4, we prove the Pareto-conformity
of three natural psychological models. Our proofs actually hold for the more general and abstract
Quotient Model that captures various additional models. We evaluate our algorithms in Section 6.
It serves as a proof of concept that our algorithms have reasonable practical run times and yield
promising travel time improvements for instances in the traffic network of Berlin.
Related Work. There has been no unique understanding of strategic routing in research
until this point. Van Essen [27] uses a choice-theoretical approach and concludes that individual
route choice and travel information that stimulates non-selfish user behavior have a large impact
on the network efficiency. Kro¨ller et al. [14] investigate due to what kind of incentives agents
would deviate from the shortest-path route. Their results show that certain incentives can
increase the drivers’ willingness of taking detours. Moreover, they show that there is a high
interest in services providing alternative routes, and strategic routing is considered to have the
potential of solving traffic issues such as congestion and pollution.
For standard algorithmic techniques in efficient route planning, we refer to the survey of
Bast et al. [2]. Ko¨hler et al. [15] deal with finding static and also time-dependent traffic flows
minimizing the overall travel time. Also, as stated by Strasser [26], routing with predicted
congestion is well-studied, e.g., by Delling and Wagner [7], Demiryurek et al. [8], Delling [5] and
Nannicini et al. [19]. Route planning with alternative routes was investigated by Abraham et
al. [1] and Paraskevopoulos and Zaroliagis [21]. They propose algorithms that find alternative
routes by evaluating properties with regard to an original route.
Lastly, we emphasize that strategic routing is very different from selfish routing as proposed
by Roughgarden and Tardos [23]. In contrast to our global optimization approach, in selfish
routing individual strategic agents select their routes to optimize their own travel times, given
the route choices of other agents. While often static flows are considered in selfish routing, Sering
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and Skutella [24] analyzed selfish driver behavior for a dynamic flow-over-time model. Another
related selfish routing variant is Stackelberg routing [13, 4, 12, 3], where an altruistic central
authority controls a fraction of the traffic and first routes it in a way to improve the travel times
for all other selfish agents which choose their route afterwards.
2 A Framework for Strategic Routing
In the following, we provide a framework that supports the formalization of a given strategic
routing scenario. We employ a two-step process. The first step categorizes the scenario by
distilling its crucial aspects. The second step transforms it into an algorithmic problem.
2.1 Categorization
Categorizing a scenario at hand boils down to answering the following questions.
What is the goal we aim to achieve? There are different objectives one can pursue
when routing strategically. A city might be interested in reducing particulate matter emission in
a certain region. As a routing service provider, the goal could be to minimize the travel time
for as many customers as possible. A system of centrally controlled autonomous vehicles might
want to achieve a minimum overall travel time.
How can we influence the agents? How we recommend routes determines which agents
we can influence and whether we can make different suggestions to different agents. A city
administration can put up signs to influence all vehicles in a certain area, making the same
suggestion to each agent. Navigation providers, on the other hand, can influence only a limited
number of vehicles but could make different suggestions to different agents.
How much control do we have over the agents? The willingness of users to follow an
alternative route depends on the use case. While a navigation provider cannot force its users to
use a specific route, and the acceptance of detouring depends heavily on the additional length,
there are scenarios where the suggested route will always be accepted or agents end up in an
equilibrium or in a system-optimal distribution on the suggested routes.
What is the starting situation? We either assume that there is already existing traffic,
or that we design traffic from scratch. Although the former is certainly more common, the latter
applies to, e.g., the scenario of centrally controlled autonomous vehicles.
How do the uninfluenced agents react? If only a fraction of the traffic is routed
strategically, the remaining traffic might react with respect to the change. For instance, it is
a valid assumption that after some time, all traffic settles in an equilibrium. Another simple
assumption is that the other traffic does not change at all.
2.2 Problem Formalization
In this section, we first propose a generic formalization whose degrees of freedom can then be
filled to reflect a specific scenario. We focus on the Single Alternative Path (SAP) scenario,
which we study algorithmically in Section 3. We use it as an example how fixing answers to the
questions raised in Section 2.1 naturally fills the degrees of freedom.
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Generic Strategic Routing Considerations. Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph. For
every pair of nodes (s, t) ∈ V 2, the demand d : V 2 → Q denotes the amount of traffic flow that
has to be routed from s to t. For every edge e ∈ E, let τe : Q≥0 → Q>0 be a monotonically
increasing cost function. For x ∈ Q≥0, τe(x) describes the costs for a single agent traversing an
edge e ∈ E while there is a traffic flow of x vehicles per unit of time on e.
The solution to a strategic routing problem is a traffic distribution to paths in the network
that routes agents according to d. Let P be the set of all simple paths in G. By f : P → Q≥0
we denote the flow, where f(P ) states the amount of traffic flow using path P . Extending
the notion, let f(e) =
∑
e∈P f(P ) be the total traffic flow on an edge e. For all x ∈ Q≥0, let
τP (x) =
∑
e∈P τe(x) be the costs per agent on P assuming that the total traffic on P is x.
Paths are denoted as tuples of vertices, i.e., (v1, . . . , vk) with vi ∈ V is a path if for 1 < i ≤ k,
(vi−1, vi) ∈ E . In addition, we consider paths as edge sets and use set operators, which also
translates to the notion of cost functions, e.g., for paths P and Q let τP∩Q(x) =
∑
e∈P∩Q τe(x).
Means of Influence. In the SAP problem, we assume that we can influence all agents on
a given original st-path Q and suggest a single alternative st-path P .
Starting Situation and Uninfluenced Traffic. We assume that there is existing traffic
that satisfies all demands and that uninfluenced agents stick with their previous routes. Note
that this allows us to integrate the uninfluenced traffic into the cost functions. Thus, we can
formalize it as if there was no initial traffic and that all demands are equal to 0 except for the
traffic on the original route Q which satisfies the demand d(s, t) > 0. For brevity, we denote
d = d(s, t).
Level of Control. We assume that agents make their own decisions. Given an original
route Q and alternative P a psychological model determines the amount of flow xP on P . The
flow on Q is then d− xP . We consider the following three psychological models; see Section 4
for formal definitions. The System Optimum assumes agents distribute optimally with respect
to the optimization criterion defined below. In the User Equilibrium [28] agents act selfishly
leading to an equilibrium where no agent can improve by unilaterally changing their route [23].
In the Linear Model we assume that the willingness to choose P is linearly dependent on the
ratio of the costs on Q and P .
Optimization Criterion. The optimization criterion formalizes the goal to be achieved,
which is the overall travel time for SAP. Hence, we interpret the cost functions τe as latency
functions, i.e., the time a single agent needs to traverse the edge e. In the SAP problem, we
only consider one alternative P to an original route Q. Assume that we have a flow of x ∈ [0, d]
on P . Then, the edges in P \Q have flow x, the edges of Q \ P have flow d− x and the edges of
P ∩Q have flow d. Thus, the overall cost is
CP (x) = x · τP\Q(x) + (d− x) · τQ\P (d− x) + d · τP∩Q(d). (1)
For the value xP determined by the psychological model, the actual cost of an alternative route
P is CP (xP ), which we abbreviate with CP . Let P be a set of alternative paths. Computing the
path P in P with optimal CP is called scoring P.
Summary and Problem Variants. To sum up the SAP problem, given a route Q from
s to t, a demand d of agents per unit of time and a psychological model, the SAP problem asks
for the optimal alternative route P such that the overall travel time CP is minimized.
In general P can have arbitrarily many overlaps with Q. Additionally, we consider two
variants of SAP, where we require the routes to be more or less disjoint. Disjoint Single
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Alternative Path (D-SAP) requires P and Q to be completely disjoint. Moreover, 1-Disjoint
Single Alternative Path (1D-SAP) requires P \Q to be a single connected path, i.e., P diverts
from Q at most once but can share the edges at the start and the end with Q.
3 Algorithms for Single Alternative Path
Consider two alternative paths P1 and P2 with cost functions τP1 and τP2 , respectively. Assume
that for any amount of traffic x ∈ [0, d], the cost of P1 is not larger than of P2, i.e., τP1(x) ≤ τP2(x).
It seems intuitive that it is never worse to choose P1 over P2. However, this is not quite right
for two reasons. First, it does not hold for arbitrary psychological models, which determine
the amount of agents (potentially in a somewhat degenerate fashion) who choose P1 and P2,
respectively, instead of the original route Q. Secondly, if the alternative route P1 shares many
edges with the original route Q it has only little potential to distribute traffic, whereas the
seemingly worse alternative P2 could do better in this regard.
We resolve the first issue by defining a property that we call (weak) Pareto-conformity.
Moreover, in Section 4, we show for various psychological models that they are in fact Pareto-
conform. To resolve the second issue with shared edges, we introduce a notion of dominance
between paths that takes the overlap with Q into account.
Let τ1 and τ2 be two cost functions defined on the interval [0, d] and let τ
′
i denote the
derivative of τi.
∗ For two alternative paths P1 and P2, we say that P1 dominates P2, denoted by
P1  P2, if τP1 ≤ τP2 and τ ′P1∩Q ≤ τ ′P2∩Q. Note that, if P1 ∩Q = P2 ∩Q, then this simplifies to
τP1 ≤ τP2 .
Intuitively, the requirement τP1 ≤ τP2 indicates that P1 is the cheaper alternative compared
to P2. Moreover, concerning τ
′
P1∩Q ≤ τ ′P2∩Q, note that this is equivalent to τ ′Q\P1 ≥ τ ′Q\P2 . Thus,
bypassing Q \ P1 by using P1 saves more than if the same amount of drivers bypasses Q \ P2 by
using P2. With this, we can define the above-mentioned Pareto-conformity.
Definition 1. A psychological model is Pareto-conform if P1  P2 implies CP1 ≤ CP2. It is
weakly Pareto-conform if this holds for paths that have equal intersection with Q.
To simplify notation, we assume without loss of generality that there are no two different
paths P1 and P2 with P1  P2 and P2  P1. This can, e.g., be achieved by slight perturbation
of the cost functions, or by resolving every tie arbitrarily.
In the following we give different algorithms for the SAP, 1D-SAP and D-SAP problems.
The algorithms involve solving one or more multi-criteria shortest path problems as subroutine.
Algorithms for this problem range from the fundamental examination of the bicriteria case [10]
to the usage of speed-up techniques [6, 16] in the multi-criteria case. One such algorithm is the
multi-criteria Dijkstra, which has exponential run time in the worst case [17] but is known to be
efficient in many practical applications [18].
The algorithms we present first (Sections 3.1–3.3) require solving only a single multi-criteria
shortest path problem, with the D-SAP setting requiring fewer criteria than SAP and 1D-SAP.
In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we propose approaches that require multiple such searches. Though
the former seems preferable, the latter has some advantages. It requires fewer criteria in the
multi-criteria sub-problems, it requires only weak Pareto-conformity for the 1-disjoint setting,
and it allows for easy parallelization. Our experiments in Section 6 indicate that the variants
requiring fewer criteria are often faster for long routes.
3.1 Reduction to Multi-Criteria Shortest Path
We are now ready to solve SAP. Definition 1 directly yields the following lemma.
∗In the remainder, we implicitly assume all cost functions to be only defined on [0, d], e.g., τ1 ≤ τ2 means
τ1(x) ≤ τ2(x) for all x ∈ [0, d]. Also, we implicitly assume functions to be differentiable.
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Lemma 2. For any instance of SAP with a Pareto-conform psychological model, there exists an
optimal solution that is not dominated by any other alternative.
Thus, to solve SAP, it suffices to find all alternative paths that are not dominated by other
paths, and then choose the best among these potential solutions. We reduce the problem of
computing the set of potential solutions to a multi-criteria shortest path problem. In such a
problem, each path corresponds to a point p ∈ Qk, where the entry at the i-th position of p is
the cost of the path with respect to the i-th criterion. One then searches for all solutions that
are not Pareto dominated by other solutions. For two points p1, p2 ∈ Qk, p1 Pareto dominates p2
if p1 ≤ p2 component-wise. Finding all solutions that are not Pareto dominated is the previously
mentioned multi-criteria shortest path problem. How the transformation to a multi-criteria
problem exactly works depends on the cost functions.
Assume for now that τ(x) = ax2 + b for positive a and b. We call the family of cost functions
of this form canonical cost functions. It is closed under addition. Thus, the cost function of each
path is also a canonical cost function. Note that two different canonical cost functions intersect in
at most one point on [0, d]. Thus, we have τ1 ≤ τ2 if and only if τ1(0) ≤ τ2(0) and τ1(d) ≤ τ2(d).
It follows that requiring τ1 ≤ τ2 is equivalent to saying that (τ1(0), τ1(d)) Pareto dominates
(τ2(0), τ2(d)). Additionally, the function τ1+τ2 can be represented by (τ1(0)+τ2(0), τ1(d)+τ2(d)).
Similarly, with τ ′1(x) = 2a1x and τ ′2(x) = 2a2x we have τ ′1 ≤ τ ′2 if and only if a1 ≤ a2. Addition
works again as expected.
To generalize this concept, consider a class of functions T that is closed under addition. We say
that T has Pareto dimension k if the following holds. There exists a function p : T → Qk such that
τ1 dominates τ2 if and only if p(τ1) Pareto dominates p(τ2), and such that p(τ1+τ2) = p(τ1)+p(τ2).
We call p the Pareto representation of T . The above canonical cost functions have Pareto
dimension 2 and their derivatives have Pareto dimension 1.
With this, P1  P2 reduces to having p(τP1) ≤ p(τP2) and p′(τ ′P1∩Q) ≤ p′(τ ′P2∩Q), where p′ is
a Pareto representation of the class of all derivatives of functions in T . This is equivalent to
the concatenation of p(τP1) and p
′(τ ′P1∩Q) Pareto dominating the concatenation of p(τP2) and
p′(τ ′P2∩Q). Thus, dominance of paths reduces to Pareto dominance.
Theorem 3. SAP with Pareto-conform psychological model and cost functions with Pareto
dimension k whose derivatives have Pareto dimension ` reduces to solving a multi-criteria shortest
path problem with k + ` criteria and scoring the result.
Proof. Let p and p′ denote the Pareto mappings for the cost functions and for their derivatives,
respectively. Every edge e = (vi, vj) is mapped to the k + `-dimensional vector obtained by
concatenating p(τe) and p
′(τ ′e∩Q). Because p(τ1+τ2) = p(τ1)+p(τ2) and p
′(τ ′1+τ ′2) = p′(τ ′1)+p′(τ ′2),
solving the k+ `-criteria shortest path problem from s to t with these vectors yields all s-t-paths
that are not dominated. By Lemma 2, the optimal solution is among these paths and can thus
be obtained by computing CP for every path P in the result and choosing the best one.
3.2 Enforcing 1-Disjoint Routes
1D-SAP can be solved by modifying the graph and then applying the same approach as above.
Let Q = (v1, . . . , vq) with s = v1, t = vq. We consider the graph G
′, which is a copy of G where
for each vi ∈ {v2, . . . , vq−1} a node v′i is added. Moreover, vi in G′ has all outgoing edges of vi
in G, but only the incoming edge from vi−1. Similarly, v′i in G
′ has all incoming edges of vi in
G, but only the outgoing edge to v′i+1; see Figure 1. With this, computing all non-dominated
1-disjoint paths in G reduces to computing all non-dominated paths in G′.
Theorem 4. Theorem 3 also holds for 1D-SAP.
Proof. We show that for every 1-disjoint st-path P in G there is an st-path P ′ in G′ with the
same cost function and vice versa. With this we can apply the same approach as in Theorem 3
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Figure 1: Graph transformation for the 1D-SAP algorithm. Blue edges represent an arbitrary
number of incoming edges, red edges an arbitrary number of outgoing edges.
to compute the set of non-dominated st-paths in G′, which represents the set of non-dominated
1-disjoint st-paths in G. Afterwards, we compute the optimal solution in G as in Theorem 3. Let
P ′ be an st-path in G′ and let Qout = (s, v2, . . . , vq−1) and Qin = (v′2, . . . , v′q−1, t) be the parts
of the original route and its copy in the modified graph G′ that have the outgoing and incoming
edges augmented with s and t, respectively. First observe, that P ′ ∩Qout is a prefix of P ′, as P ′
cannot get back to Qout after it diverted from it due to the fact that we removed all incoming
edges from vertices in Qout (other than s). Similarly, P
′ ∩Qin is a suffix of P ′ as t is the only
vertex on Qin with outgoing edges. Thus, the path P in G we get by replacing every v
′
i in P
′
with the corresponding vi is 1-disjoint and has the same cost function as P
′. Analogously, every
1-disjoint st-path P in G can be transformed to such a path P ′ in G′ with the same cost.
3.3 Fewer Criteria for Disjoint SAP
We now consider the D-SAP variant whose major advantage is that we can solve it with fewer
criteria in the multi-criteria shortest path part of the algorithm. Analogously to Lemma 2, the
following lemma follows from Definition 1.
Lemma 5. For any instance of D-SAP with a weakly Pareto-conform psychological model, there
exists an optimal solution that is not dominated by any other alternative disjoint from Q.
To guarantee that we only find paths disjoint from Q, we remove Q from the graph. For two
paths P1 and P2 in the resulting graph, the dominance P1  P2 simplifies to τP1 ≤ τP2 . This
observation together with Lemma 5 gives us the following theorem. Note that we only need
weak Pareto-conformity here, as all paths have no intersection with Q.
Theorem 6. D-SAP with a weakly Pareto-conform psychological model and cost functions with
Pareto dimension k reduces to solving a multi-criteria shortest path problem with k criteria and
scoring the result.
3.4 Fewer Criteria for 1-Disjoint SAP
We start by deleting the edges of Q = (v1, . . . , vq) from the graph. In the resulting graph, for
every pair 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q, we calculate the set Pi,j of all routes between vi and vj that are
minimal with respect to dominance. We define the corresponding augmented path for a path
P ∈ Pi,j as P˜ = (v1, . . . , vi−1) ∪ P ∪ (vj+1 . . . , vq), which is a 1-disjoint path from s to t. We
denote the set of paths from s to t obtained by augmenting all paths in Pi,j by P˜i,j .
Lemma 7. For an instance of 1D-SAP with weakly Pareto-conform psychological model, there
exists an optimal solution among the paths in the sets P˜i,j.
Proof. Let P˜ be an optimal alternative path and let vi and vj be the vertices where P˜ diverts
and rejoins Q respectively. Moreover, let P be the subpath of P˜ from vi to vj . If P is in
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Pi,j , then P˜ is also in P˜i,j and the statement is true. Otherwise, if P is not in Pi,j , there is a
different path P ′ from vi to vj that dominates P . Then P˜ ′ also dominates P˜ , as in both cases
we augment the paths with the same edges, which equally increases their cost functions and
ensures P˜ ′ ∩Q = P˜ ∩Q. Thus, by weak Pareto-conformity (Definition 1), the path P˜ ′ is not
worse than P˜ and thus P˜ ′ is an optimal alternative route that is contained in P˜i,j .
From Section 3.3, we know that we can compute all non-dominated paths from vi to vj by
using a multi-criteria shortest path algorithm. Thus, 1D-SAP reduces to solving
(
q
2
) ∈ Θ(q2)
multi-criteria shortest path problems, one for each pair of vertices vi, vj ∈ Q. We note that
many shortest path algorithms actually solve a more general problem by computing paths from
a single start to all other vertices. Thus, instead of Θ(q2) shortest path problems, we can solve
q multi-target shortest path problems, using each vertex in Q as start once.
Theorem 8. 1D-SAP with weakly Pareto-conform psychological model and cost functions with
Pareto dimension k reduces to solving q multi-criteria multi-target shortest path problems with k
criteria and scoring the resulting augmented paths.
3.5 Fewer Criteria for SAP
We now provide an algorithm for the SAP problem that requires fewer criteria. We use a dynamic
program that combines non-dominated subpaths to obtain the optimal solution. To formalize
this, we need the following additional notation. For vi, vj ∈ Q with i < j, a path from vi to vj
is called Q-path or more specifically Qi,j-path. A set A of Qi,j-paths is reduced if no path in
A is dominated by another path in A. Let A and B be two reduced sets of Qi,j-paths. Their
reduced union is obtained by eliminating from A ∪B all paths that are dominated by another
path in A ∪B. Moreover, let A and B be two reduced sets of Qi,j and Qj,k-paths, respectively.
Then their reduced join is obtained by concatenating every path in A with every path in B and
eliminating all dominated paths.
We start by applying the algorithm from Section 3.4, computing the sets Pi,j for all 1 ≤ i ≤
j ≤ q, which are the reduced sets of all Qi,j-paths that are disjoint from Q. Then, we compute
sets Pj of Q1,j-paths and one can show that Pj is in fact the reduced set of all Q1,j-paths. We
initialize P1 = {(v1)}. Now, assume we have computed Pi for all i < j. We obtain Pj as the
reduced union of the following sets of Q1,j-paths: the reduced join of Pi and Pi,j for every i < j,
and the reduced join of Pj−1 and {(vj−1, vj)}.
Lemma 9. For an instance of SAP with a Pareto-conform psychological model, there exists an
optimal solution among the paths in Pq.
Proof. We show for every 1 ≤ j ≤ q that all paths from v1 to vj that are not dominated by any
other path from v1 to vj are contained in Pj .
We prove by induction. For j = 1, we have P1 = {(v1)}, which is the set of all non-dominated
v1, v1-paths. Now, assume that for all 1 ≤ i < j, Pi is the set of non-dominated paths from v1
to vi. Let P be a path from v1 to vj that is not dominated by any other path from v1 to vj . We
consider two cases.
Case 1: (vj−1, vj) ∈ P . Let Pj−1 = P \ {(vi−1, vi)}. If Pj−1 ∈ Pj−1, then, we also have
P ∈ Pj and there is nothing to show. Otherwise, if Pj−1 /∈ Pj−1, there exists a P ′j−1 ∈ Pj−1 with
P ′j−1  Pj−1, which implies P ′j−1∪{(vj−1, vj)}  Pj−1∪{(vj−1, vj)} = P . This is a contradiction
to our assumption that P is not dominated by any other path from v1 to vj .
Case 2: (vj−1, vj) /∈ P . Let vi be the last vertex P shares with Q, i.e., 1 ≤ i < j is the
maximum such that vi lies on P . Then P consists of two subpaths P = P1∪P2 such that P1 goes
from v1 to vi and P2 from vi to vj . Note that P2 is disjoint from Q. If P1 ∈ Pi and P2 ∈ Pi,j ,
then we also have P ∈ Pj and there is nothing to show. Thus, it remains to deal with the cases
that P1 /∈ Pi or P2 /∈ Pi,j .
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In the first case, for some path P ′1 ∈ Pi, we have P ′1  P1. Since τP ′1 ≤ τP1 implies τP ′1∪P2 ≤
τP1∪P2 and since τ ′(P ′1∪P2)∩Q = τ
′
P ′1∩Q ≤ τ
′
P1∩Q = τ
′
(P1∪P2)∩Q, we have P
′
1 ∪ P2  P1 ∪ P2 = P .
This is a contradiction to our assumption that P is not dominated.
In the second case, for some path P ′2 ∈ Pi,j , we have P ′2  P2. Since τP ′2 ≤ τP2 implies
τP1∪P ′2 ≤ τP1∪P2 and since τ ′(P1∪P2)∩Q = τ ′(P1∪P ′2)∩Q, we have P1 ∪ P
′
2  P1 ∪ P2 = P . This is a
contradiction to our assumption that P is not dominated.
After computing the sets Pi,j as in Section 3.4, it remains to compute Θ(q2) reduced joins
and Θ(q2) reduced unions between reduced sets of Q-paths. Then, it only remains to score
the result Pq. The shortest path computations from Section 3.4 use k criteria where k is the
Pareto-dimension of the cost functions. The reduced joins and unions are with respect to k + `
criteria, where ` is the Pareto dimension of the derivatives of the cost functions.
Theorem 10. SAP with Pareto-conform psychological model and cost functions with Pareto
dimension k whose derivatives have Pareto dimension ` reduces to solving q multi-target shortest
path problems with k parameters, executing Θ(q2) reduced join and union operations with respect
to k + ` criteria between reduced sets of Q-paths, and scoring the result Pq.
4 Psychological Models and Pareto-Conformity
In this section, we formally define the models mentioned in Section 2.2 and show their Pareto-
conformity. After considering the System Optimum Model, we define the Quotient Model, which
is a generalization of the User Equilibrium Model and the Linear Model. We give conditions
under which a Quotient Model is Pareto-conform and thereby prove that the User Equilibrium
Model and the Linear Model are both Pareto-conform.
The System Optimum Model assumes that agents distribute optimally, i.e., xP ∈ [0, d]
minimizes CP (xP ). We get that P1  P2 implies CP1(x) ≤ CP2(x) for each x ∈ [0, d].
Theorem 11. The System Optimum Model is Pareto-conform.
Proof. Let two alternative paths P1, P2 and an original path Q be given with P1  P2, i.e.,
τP1 ≤ τP2 and τ ′P1∩Q ≤ τ ′P2∩Q. The core of the proof is to show that CP1(x) ≤ CP2(x) for all
x ∈ [0, d]. Then, for the minima xP1 , xP2 ∈ [0, d] of CP1(x) and CP2(x), respectively, we get
CP1 = CP1(xP1) ≤ CP1(xP2) ≤ CP2(xP2) = CP2 , which proves Pareto-conformity.
It remains to show CP1(x) ≤ CP2(x) for all x ∈ [0, d]. Starting with CP (x) as given in Equa-
tion (1), we obtain
CP (x) = x · τP\Q(x) + (d− x) · τQ\P (d− x) + d · τP∩Q(d)
= x · (τP\Q(x) + τP∩Q(d))+ (d− x) · (τQ\P (d− x) + τP∩Q(d)) .
As τP (x) = τP\Q(x) + τP∩Q(x) and τQ(d− x) = τQ\P (d− x) + τP∩Q(d− x) this yields
CP (x) = x
(
τP (x)
(i)
+ τP∩Q(d)− τP∩Q(x)
(ii)
)
+ (d− x)(τQ(d− x) + τP∩Q(d)− τP∩Q(d− x)
(iii)
)
.
When going from CP1 to CP2 , the three parts (i), (ii) and (iii) change. As P1  P2, we directly
get τP1(x) ≤ τP2(x) for (i). Similarly, τ ′P1∩Q ≤ τ ′P2∩Q, implies that (ii) and (iii) for P1 are
upper-bounded by the corresponding terms for P2. Thus, CP1(x) ≤ CP2(x).
For the Quotient Model, let c(x) be non-decreasing, non-negative on [0, d] with c(d) > 0. If
τQ\P (d− x) + τP∩Q(d)
τP\Q(x) + τP∩Q(d)
= c(x) (2)
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has a solution in [0, d], it is unique for the following reason. The numerator and denominator are
the cost of Q and P , which are decreasing and increasing in x, respectively. Thus, the quotient
is decreasing, while c(x) is non-decreasing, which makes the solution unique. The Quotient
Model sets xP to this unique solution if it exists. If no solution exists, then the left-hand side is
either smaller or larger than c(x) for every x ∈ [0, d], in which case we set xP = 0 or xP = d,
respectively. This is the natural choice, as xP = 0 and xP = d maximizes and minimizes the
left-hand side, respectively. We note that c specifies how conservative the agents are. If c(x) = 1,
the agents distribute on Q and P such that both paths have the same cost. If c is smaller, then
agents take the alternative route, if it is not too much longer.
Recall from Equation (1) that the cost function CP (x) is a combination of the three functions
τP\Q, τQ\P , and τP∩Q. If Equation (2) has a solution xP , we know how τP\Q(x) and τQ\P (x)
relate to each other at x = xP . In other words, solving Equation (2) for τP\Q(xP ) or τQ\P (xP )
and replacing their occurrence in CP = CP (xP ) with the result lets us eliminate τQ\P or τP\Q,
respectively, from CP . We do this in the following two lemmas, which additionally take the
special cases xP = 0 and xP = d into account.
Lemma 12. Let gP (x) = (d − x) · c(x) + x. Then CP ≤ gP (xP ) ·
(
τP\Q(xP ) + τP∩Q(d)
)
. If
xP > 0, then equality holds.
Proof. First assume xP = 0. Recall that in this case the left-hand side of Equation (2) is at
most its right-hand side. Thus, for xP = 0 we obtain
CP = CP (0) = d ·
(
τQ\P (d) + τQ∩P (d)
) ≤ d · c(0) · (τP\Q(0) + τQ∩P (d)),
which proves the claim for xP = 0. For all other cases, we have to show equality. First assume
xP = d. Then the claim simplifies to CP = d · (τP\Q(d) + τP∩Q(d)), which is true.
It remains to consider 0 < xP < d, in which case xP is a solution of Equation (2). Solv-
ing Equation (2) for τQ\P (d− xP ) gives
τQ\P (d− xP ) = c(xP ) · τP\Q(xP ) + (c(xP )− 1) · τP∩Q(d),
and plugging it into the cost function CP = CP (xP ) in Equation (1) yields
CP = xP · τP\Q(xP ) + (d− xP ) · τQ\P (d− xp) + d · τP∩Q(d)
= (xP + (d− xP ) · c(xP )) · τP\Q(xP ) + (d+ (d− xP ) · (c(xP )− 1)) · τP∩Q(d)
= ((d− xP ) · c(xP ) + xP ) ·
(
τP\Q(xP ) + τP∩Q(d)
)
,
which proves the claim.
We note that c(xP ) > 0 holds for the following reason. For xP = d this is true by definition.
For xP < d, the left-hand side of Equation (2) is equal to its right-hand side or less (in which
case xP = 0). As the right-hand side is c(xP ) and the left-hand side is positive, we get c(xP ) > 0.
Thus it is fine to divide by c(xP ) in the following lemma.
Lemma 13. Let gQ(x) = d + x/c(x) − x. Then CP ≤ gQ(xP ) ·
(
τQ\P (d− xP ) + τP∩Q(d)
)
. If
xP < d, then equality holds.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 12. First, if xP = d, then the right-hand side
of Equation (2) is at most its left-hand side. Thus, for xP = d, we obtain
CP = CP (d) = d ·
(
τP\Q(d) + τP∩Q(d)
) ≤ d
c(d)
· (τQ\P (0) + τP∩Q(d)) ,
which proves the claim for xP = d. For all other cases, we have to show equality. Now, first
assume xP = 0. Then the claim simplifies to CP = d · (τQ\P (d) + τP∩Q(d)), which is true.
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It remains to consider 0 < xP < d, in which case xP is a solution of Equation (2). Solv-
ing Equation (2) for τP\Q(xP ) gives
τP\Q(xP ) =
1
c(xP )
· τQ\P (d− xP ) +
(
1
c(xP )
− 1
)
· τP∩Q(d),
and plugging it into the cost function CP = CP (xP ) in Equation (1) yields
CP = xP · τP\Q(xP ) + (d− xP ) · τQ\P (d− xP ) + d · τP∩Q(d)
=
(
d− xP + xP · 1
c(xP )
)
· τQ\P (d− xP ) +
(
d+ xP ·
(
1
c(xP )
− 1
))
· τP∩Q(d)
=
(
d+
xP
c(xP )
− xP
)
· (τQ\P (d− xP ) + τP∩Q(d)) ,
which proves the claim.
The following lemma provides the core inequalities we need when comparing the cost of
two alternative paths. Note how the inequalities in parts 1 and 2 of the lemma resemble the
representation of the cost CP in Lemma 12 and Lemma 13, respectively.
Lemma 14. Let P1 and P2 be alternative paths with P1  P2 and let x1, x2 ∈ [0, d]. Then
1. τP1\Q(x1) + τP1∩Q(d) ≤ τP2\Q(x2) + τP2∩Q(d) if x1 ≤ x2, and
2. τQ\P1(d− x1) + τP1∩Q(d) ≤ τQ\P2(d− x2) + τP2∩Q(d) if x1 ≥ x2.
Proof. Recall that P1  P2 means that for all x ∈ [0, d], τP1(x) ≤ τP2(x) and τ ′P1∩Q(x) ≤
τ ′P2∩Q(x), where τ
′ denotes the derivative of τ . For the first case x1 ≤ x2 we get
τP1\Q(x1) + τP1∩Q(d) = τP1\Q(x1) + τP1∩Q(x1)− τP1∩Q(x1) + τP1∩Q(d)
= τP1(x1) + τP1∩Q(d)− τP1∩Q(x1),
using that τP1(x) ≤ τP2(x) and τ ′P1∩Q(x) ≤ τ ′P2∩Q(x)
≤ τP2(x1) + τP2∩Q(d)− τP2∩Q(x1)
= τP2\Q(x1) + τP2∩Q(x1) + τP2∩Q(d)− τP2∩Q(x1)
= τP2\Q(x1) + τP2∩Q(d).
As τP2\Q is an increasing function and x2 ≥ x1, we obtain τP2\Q(x1) ≤ τP2\Q(x2), which concludes
this case.
The case x1 ≥ x2 works very similar. We obtain
τQ\P1(d− x1) + τP1∩Q(d) = τQ\P1(d− x1) + τP1∩Q(d− x1)− τP1∩Q(d− x1) + τP1∩Q(d)
= τQ(d− x1) + τP1∩Q(d)− τP1∩Q(d− x1),
and using that τ ′P1∩Q(x) ≤ τ ′P2∩Q(x), we get
≤ τQ(d− x1) + τP2∩Q(d)− τP2∩Q(d− x1)
= τQ\P2(d− x1) + τP2∩Q(d− x1) + τP2∩Q(d)− τP2∩Q(d− x1)
= τQ\P2(d− x1) + τP2∩Q(d).
As τQ\P2 is an increasing function, τQ\P2(d − x) decreases in x. Thus, as x1 ≥ x2, we obtain
τQ\P2(d− x1) ≤ τQ\P2(d− x2), which concludes the proof.
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Applying the previous three lemmas and dealing with the additional functions gP (x) and
gQ(x) in Lemma 12 and Lemma 13, respectively, yields the following.
Theorem 15. The Quotient Model is Pareto-conform if c(d) ≤ 1 and, for all x ∈ [0, d],
c(x) · (1− c(x))− x · c′(x) ≤ 0.
Proof. Consider two paths P1 and P2 such that P1  P2. We want to show CP1 ≤ CP2 .
First, assume the case xP1 ≤ xP2 . If xP1 = xP2 = 0, we get CP1 = CP2 as all traffic is routed
over Q for both alternative paths. Hence, assume xP1 ≥ 0 and xP2 > 0. By Lemma 12, we get
CP1 ≤ gP (xP1)·
(
τP1\Q(xP1) + τP1∩Q(d)
)
, with gP (x) = (d−x)·c(x)+x. For the second factor, we
can use Lemma 14.1 to obtain τP1\Q(xP1)+τP1∩Q(d) ≤ τP2\Q(xP2)+τP2∩Q(d). Concerning the first
factor, gP (x) is non-decreasing if g
′
P (x) ≥ 0 for x ∈ [0, d]. We get g′P (x) = (d−x) ·c′(x)−c(x)+1.
As c(x) is non-decreasing, (d − x) · c′(x) and −c(x) have their minimum at x = d. Thus,
for x ∈ [0, d], g′P (x) ≥ g′P (d) = 1 − c(d). As c(d) ≤ 1 is required by the theorem, gP (x) is
non-decreasing, which yields gP (xP1) ≤ gP (xP2). To summarize, we thus get
CP1 ≤ gP (xP1) ·
(
τP1\Q(xP1) + τP1∩Q(d)
) ≤ gP (xP2) · (τP2\Q(xP2) + τP2∩Q(d)) = CP2 ,
where the last equality holds due to Lemma 12 and the fact that xP2 > 0.
Secondly, consider the case xP1 > xP2 . We use Lemma 13 and hereby get CP1 ≤ gQ(xP1) ·(
τQ\P1(d− xP1) + τP1∩Q(d)
)
, with g(x) = d + x/c(x) − x. For the second factor, we can
use Lemma 14.2 to obtain τQ\P1(d− xP1) + τP1∩Q(d) ≤ τQ\P2(d− xP2) + τP2∩Q(d). Concerning
the first factor, gQ(x) is non-increasing if g
′
Q(x) ≤ 0 for x ∈ [0, d]. We get g′Q(x) = (c(x) −
x · c′(x))/c2(x)− 1, which is at most 0 if c(x)− x · c′(x)− c2(x) ≤ 0, which is required by the
theorem. To summarize, we thus get
CP1 ≤ gQ(xP1) ·
(
τQ\P1(d− xP1) + τP1∩Q(d)
)
≤ gQ(xP2) ·
(
τQ\P2(d− xP2) + τP2∩Q(d)
)
= CP2 ,
where the last equality holds due to Lemma 13 and the fact that xP2 < xP1 ≤ d.
As mentioned in in Section 2.2, the User Equilibrium Model sets xP such that both paths P
and Q have the same cost per agent, if possible. More formally and in terms of the Quotient
Model, we obtain the User Equilibrium Model by setting c(x) = 1 in Equation (2), which is
non-decreasing, non-negative, and satisfies c(d) > 0.
Corollary 16. The User Equilibrium Model is Pareto-conform.
Proof. To apply Theorem 15, we have to check whether the constant function c(x) = 1 satisfies
the requirements. Clearly c(d) ≤ 1. Moreover, c′(x) = 0 and thus the left-hand side of the last
condition resolves to 0.
The Linear Model is defined by setting c(x) to be an increasing linear function, i.e., c(x) =
c · x/d for c > 0. Note that c(x) is non-decreasing, non-negative and satisfies c(d) > 0.
Corollary 17. The Linear Model with 0 < c ≤ 1 is Pareto-conform.
Proof. We check the requirements of Theorem 15. First, c(d) = c ≤ 1. And secondly, c(x) · (1−
c(x))− x · c′(x) = cx/d− c2x2/d2 − cx/d ≤ 0.
We note that the Linear Model with c ≤ 1 is less conservative than the User Equilibrium
Model, i.e., more agents use the alternative path, in particular if only few agents would use it
based on its cost. Moreover, a lower c makes the model less conservative.
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Figure 2: Constructed graph GM,w for the reduction from SubsetSum.
5 Complexity of SAP
Our algorithms introduced in Section 3 have an exponential worst case running time. In the
following we want to show that solving the SAP problem is indeed hard, since the corresponding
decision problem, i.e., deciding whether a specific problem instance is solvable with an overall
travel time of at most t, is NP-complete.
Theorem 18. SAP is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is in NP, since a suitable alternative path P can be guessed and verified in
polynomial time. For showing NP-hardness we reduce from SubsetSum, which is well-known
to be NP-complete [9]. Formally, in SubsetSum we are given a finite set M ⊂ N and a target
number w ∈ N and the problem is to decide whether there exists a subset M ′ ⊆M such that
w =
∑
m∈M ′m. For an arbitrary SubsetSum instance (M,w), let mi denote the i-th element
from M , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |M |, and let s = ∑m∈M m.
Towards reducing SubsetSum to SAP, we construct for the instance (M,w) the directed
graph GM,w = (V = {v0, v1, . . . , v|M |}, E = {ei,j | 1 ≤ i ≤ |M | ∧ j ∈ {1, 2}} ∪ {eQ}) where, for
1 ≤ i ≤ |M | and j ∈ {1, 2}, edges ei,j connect vertex vi−1 to vi and edge eQ connects v0 to
v|M |. See Figure 2 for an illustration. We set the cost functions as follows: τei,1(x) = mi · x,
τei,2(x) = mi and τeQ(x) = sx + s, for all x. In the corresponding SAP problem on GM,w we
search for a path from v0 to v|M |, with the original path Q = (eQ). For any v0, v|M |-path P 6= Q
the psychological model p is defined as
p{P,Q}(P ) =
{
1, if ∀x : τP (x) = wx+ s− w;
0, otherwise.
We now show that this model is Pareto-conform. Let P1, P2 6= Q be v0, v|M |-paths. If τP1 = τP2 ,
then CP1 = CP2 . Otherwise, because τP1(1) = τP2(1) and since the functions inter- sect in [0,∞)
at exactly one point, without loss of generality τP1(0) < τP2(0) and τP1(2) > τP2(2). Thus neither
P1  P2 nor P1  P2 and the psychological model is Pareto-conform for any demand d ≥ 2.
We now show that (M,w) is a yes-instance of SubsetSum if and only if for demand d = 2
there is an alternative path to Q, such that the overall travel time is strictly less than 6s. Let P
be a v0, v|M |-path not using eQ. We define IP = {i | ei,1 ∈ P}. Note that this set uniquely
identifies P . Then the latency of path P is given by τP =
∑
i∈IP mix+ s−
∑
i∈IP mi.
Assume (M,w) is a yes-instance of SubsetSum. Let M ′ ⊆ M such that w = ∑m∈M ′m.
Let P be the path with IP = {i | mi ∈ M ′}. Then p{P,Q}(P ) = 1 and thus the overall travel
time is d · τP (d) = 2(2w + s− w) < 6s when P is suggested as alternative to Q.
For the other direction, if there is a path P , such that the overall travel time is less than 6s
when P is suggested as alternative to Q, we know that p{P,Q}(P ) > 0 as otherwise the overall
travel time would be 6s = dτQ(d). Thus, we must have p{P,Q}(P ) = 1. By definition, this means
that
∑
i∈IP mi = w and thus there is a subset M
′ ⊆ M , such that w = ∑m∈M ′m and hence
(M,w) is a yes-instance of SubsetSum.
It directly follows that our proposed variants D-SAP and 1D-SAP are also NP-complete.
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Corollary 19. D-SAP and 1D-SAP are NP-complete.
Proof. Every valid solution for SAP needs to be completely disjoint in the proof above. Thus
the theorem holds for the case of restricted disjointedness as well.
6 Empirical Evaluation
In this section we fix implementation details and evaluate the proposed algorithms. Our
evaluation focuses on the following aspects.
Performance. Are the algorithms sufficiently efficient for practical problem instances? How
do the different algorithms compare in terms of run time?
Strategic Improvement. How much does strategic routing improve the overall travel time?
How does the requirement of disjoint or 1-disjoint alternatives impact this improvement?
Additional evaluation regarding the psychological models can be found in Section 6. For now,
we fix the psychological model to be the User Equilibrium.
We model cost functions τe as proposed by the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads [20], i.e., for
parameters α, β ≥ 0, we have τe(x) = `e/se · (1 + α(x/ce)β) where se, ce, and `e denote free flow
speed, capacity and length of e. We set α = 0.15 and β = 2. Thus, for appropriate a and b, we
get canonical cost functions of the form τe(x) = ax
2 + b as defined in Section 3.
For solving the multi-criteria shortest path problem, we implement a multi-criteria A*
variant [16]. As lower bound, we use the distances in the parameters a and b to t. These
distances are calculated using two runs of Dijkstra’s algorithm. We note that A* solves a
multi-target shortest path problem, which we need for two algorithms; see Section 3.4. For
calculating the Pareto-frontiers we use the simple cull algorithm [29].
We use the following naming scheme. We abbreviate the algorithms from Sections 3.1 and 3.2
with SAP and 1D-SAP, respectively. We denote the fewer criteria (FC) approaches with D-SAP
(Section 3.3) 1D-SAP-FC (Section 3.4) and SAP-FC (Section 3.5). To evaluate the strategic
improvement, we compare them to the solution of proposing only the shortest path to all agents,
assuming either one single agent (1-SP) or d agents (d-SP) on every edge.
We test our implementations on the street network of Berlin, Germany with 75 origin–
destination pairs (OD-pairs), randomly chosen from real-world OD-pairs. The OD-pairs as
well as the network were provided by TomTom. For every OD-pair, we set Q to the shortest
route for a single agent and run all algorithms for our psychological models and demands
d ∈ {100, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000}. One unit of demand represents 7–20 vehicles per
hour. The imprecision is due to the fact that the exact penetration rate of TomTom devices is
unknown and that the map data is given with respect to only TomTom users.
All experiments have been conducted on a machine with two Intel Xeon Gold 5118 (12-core)
CPUs with 64GiB of memory. The multi-criteria shortest-path calculations of SAP-FC and
1D-SAP-FC have been parallelized to 20 threads.
Figure 3: Visualization of example routes: original route (blue), optimal alternative routes with
respect to the User Equilibrium for SAP (green), for 1D-SAP (black), and D-SAP (orange).
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Figure 4: Left: Absolute run times. Each point represents one OD-pair for demand d = 2000.
For D-SAP, we excluded the OD-pairs that did not have a solution that was disjoint from the
original route. Right: Speedup of SAP-FC over SAP, with one point for each OD-pair and each
value of d.
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Figure 5: The plots show the travel time per agent depending on the demand d, where each
data point is averaged over all OD-pairs. Absolute values are shown on the left, relative values
with respect to the d-SP solution are shown on the right.
Run Time. Figure 4 shows the run times of our algorithms, depending on the length of
the original route. The main takeaways from Figure 4 (left) are that requiring disjoint routes
makes the problem easier and that the algorithms requiring fewer criteria but more multi-criteria
shortest path queries are faster for instances with long original routes. Figure 4 (right) shows
the speedup of SAP-FC over SAP. One can see that SAP is actually faster than SAP-FC for
most instances, sometimes up to two orders of magnitude. However, these are the instances
with short original route, which have low run times anyways. On the other hand, SAP-FC is
up to one order of magnitude faster than SAP on some instances with long original path. We
note that the multi-criteria shortest path queries in SAP-FC can be parallelized, and we used 20
threads in our experiments. However, this parallelization cannot explain such high speedups. In
Figure 4 (left), one can see that SAP-FC actually has rather consistent run times compared to
SAP and never exceeded 30 minutes. Thus, our observations show that we can feasibly solve the
problems SAP and even more so 1D-SAP in the context of small distance queries, e.g., in city
networks, despite the worst-case exponential running time.
Strategic Improvement. We assess how much strategic routing gains in terms of travel
time with respect to different disjointedness. Figure 3 shows solutions for SAP, 1D-SAP and
D-SAP routes. The resulting travel times are shown in Figure 5. We see that the larger the
number of agents, the more we benefit from strategic routing. The plots show that, in direct
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Figure 6: Visualization of example routes: Original route (blue), and optimal alternative routes
for the SAP problem with respect to System Optimum (black), User Equilibrium (green) and
Linear Model (orange).
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Figure 7: Left: Overall travel time of the User Equilibrium and the Linear Model, relative
to the System Optimum, depending on the demand d. Each data point is averaged over all
OD-pairs. Right: The fraction of flow xP /d on the alternative route depending on the d and
the psychological model; again averaged over all OD-pairs.
comparison to the shortest path assuming d agents per edge (d-SP), the SAP algorithms yield
results of about 50 % reduced travel time for growing values of d. Constraining the alternative
route to be 1-disjoint from the original only has a slight disadvantage (on average 1D-SAP is
worse by 2.2 %). Thus, taking into account that 1D-SAP can be solved faster, solving 1D-SAP
might give a good trade-off between run time and quality of the solution. Demanding full
disjointedness leads to much worse travel times, as in 62.3 % of our test cases, no fully disjoint
alternative exists, due to the graph structure. In this case, we assume that all agents use the
original route. Restricted to the instances that allow for a fully disjoint solution, the solution to
D-SAP on average leads to a 11.4 % higher travel time per agent compared to 1D-SAP.
Psychological Models. The gain of splitting traffic also depends on the psychological
model. We note that for most OD-pairs, the different psychological models lead to the same route
and only differ in the amount of traffic using the alternative. However, there are examples where
we actually get different routes, see, e.g., Figure 6. In this particular instance it is interesting
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to see that the System Optimum would require a large detour for some drivers (around 17 %),
which they probably would not accept without additional incentive.
To compare the models we proposed, we examine the proportion of agents using the suggested
alternative route, and the resulting costs compared to the overall travel time when using the
System Optimum in Figure 7. The Linear Model is configured with c = 1. One can see in Figure 7
(left) that for increasing d, the User Equilibrium overall travel time approaches that of the
System Optimum, indicating that the optimal alternative route of the User Equilibrium is not
much worse than the System Optimum. This is supported by the similar amount of agents that
are assigned by the models to the alternative route, as shown in Figure 7 (right). In contrast,
the Linear Model uses the alternative route a lot more. We note that this is to be expected, as
discussed in Section 4.
7 Conclusion
Besides providing a framework for formalizing strategic routing scenarios, we gave different
algorithms solving SAP. Both of these contributions open the door to future research. Concerning
SAP, we have seen that different psychological models can lead to different alternative routes, and
it would be interesting to study how people actually behave depending on the exact formulation
of the suggestion and on potential additional incentives to take a longer route. It is promising to
study models that lie in-between the User Equilibrium and the Linear Model. By setting, e.g.,
c(x) = tanh(a · x/d) in the Quotient Model (Equation (2)), we obtain a model that behaves like
the Linear Model for small x and approaches the User Equilibrium Model for larger x, where
the constant a controls how quickly that happens. We note that this choice of c(x) satisfies the
conditions of Theorem 15, implying that the resulting model is Pareto-conform, which makes
the algorithms from Section 3 applicable. Concerning algorithmic performance, we have seen
that our proof-of-concept implementation yields reasonable run times. Our implementation
uses techniques such as A* to speed up computation. Beyond that, there is still potential
for engineering, e.g., by employing preprocessing techniques. Beyond the SAP problem, our
framework gives rise to various problems in the context of strategic routing that are worth
studying algorithmically.
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